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Abstract 
Probabilistic independence can dramatically sim­
plify the task of eliciting, representing, and com­
puting with probabilities in large domains. A key 
technique in achieving these benefits is the idea 
of graphical modeling. We survey existing no­
tions of independence for utility functions in a 
multi-attribute space, and suggest that these can 
be used to achieve similar advantages. 
Our new results concern conditional additive in­
dependence, which we show always has a per­
fect representation as separation in an undirected 
graph (a Markov network). Conditional addi­
tive independencies entail a particular functional 
form for the utility function that is analogous to a 
product decomposition of a probability function, 
and confers analogous benefits. This functional 
form has been utilized in the Bayesian network 
and influence diagram literature, but generally 
without an explanation in terms of independence. 
The functional form yields a decomposition of the 
utility function that can greatly speed up expected 
utility calculations, particularly when the utility 
graph has a similar topology to the probabilistic 
network being used. 
1 Introduction 
Work over the past decade in artificial intelligence concern­
ing probabilities has been extremely successful. Charges 
of epistemological inadequacy [MH69] have become much 
easier to rebut since the advent of Bayesian networks and 
similar techniques. 
But probabilities are not an end in themselves. Their most 
important purpose is in classical decision theory, as part of 
the maximum expected utility paradigm (see, e.g., [Fre88, 
GS88, Sav54]). This leads to the concern that other parts 
of decision theory might not be keeping pace with the new 
developments in probabilistic modeling. In particular, we 
are interested in the problem of representing, and reasoning 
about, utility and preference. 
There are a number of important questions in this area, 
Adam Grove 
NEC Research Institute 
4 Independence Way 
Princeton NJ 08540, USA 
grove@research.nj.nec.com 
and here we report on our early observations and results 
and make a few conjectures about promising directions for 
future research. The approach we take is based on the 
idea of drawing a close analogy between probabilities and 
utilities. It is clear that some of the issues are similar: 
• The "too many numbers!" criticism of probability 
theory can apply to utilities as well. The number of 
possible worlds grows exponentially in the number of 
properties (i.e., attributes or variables) used to describe 
them. In principle, each world might require an inde­
pendently assigned utility. Of course, we may be lucky 
enough that a world's utility depends on just a few at­
tributes. In this case many different possible worlds 
will have the same utility and we will have far fewer 
distinct values to deal with. But we cannot rely on this 
in general. 
• Probabilities can be difficult to elicit and to compute 
with. For this reason, there have been many attempts 
to deal with uncertainty in a way that avoids proba­
bility, even though many (although not all) of these 
approaches are ad hoc and lack any solid foundation. 
Correspondingly, there are several common ways to 
describe how one wants a complex system to behave 
short of actually giving utilities: e.g., one can list pre­
ferred goals, impose hard or soft constraints on behav­
ior, and so on. 
Graphical models, such as Bayesian networks, address 
many of the perceived problems of probability in a fairly 
successful fashion (see, e.g., [Pea88, SP90] for an introduc­
tion to this area). The key trick, of course, is probabilistic 
independence. Independence can vastly reduce dimension­
ality, in the sense of the number of independent parameters 
we must discover. We can make many judgments of inde­
pendence based on a qualitative (typically causal) under­
standing of the domain, and afterwards elicit or learn the 
remaining conditional probabilities. But reduction of di­
mensionality is not the whole story: probabilistic indepen­
dence lends itself to graphical representations that greatly 
aid intuition and support relatively efficient computational 
techniques. 
Can a similar story be told for utilities? This is plausible 
because utility, like probability, is often highly structured. 
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Furthermore, much (but not all) of this structure can be de­
scribed in terms of independence, using one or all of several 
independence concepts that already exist in the literature. 
We begin this paper, in Section 2, with background mate­
rial including a brief survey of some existing independence 
concepts in utility theory. We note that these concepts are 
part of a well established field known as multiple-objective 
decision theory, for which [KR76] is an excellent reference. 
So far as we are aware, the relevance of the results in this 
field for artificial intelligence is a largely unexplored topic 
(although [DW91, DSW9 1, DW94, DW92] are exceptions 
to this, and there is a growing collection of work concerned 
with other aspects of utility such as [Bou94, TP94]). Our 
main results in this paper are in Section 3 and concern con­
ditional additive independence (CA-independence), whose 
definition is reviewed in Section 2. This concept seems to 
strike a good balance between being too weak (thus lead­
ing to few useful conclusions) and too stringent (thus being 
infrequently applicable). 
Our first result in Section 3 shows that this notion has a 
precise representation as separation in undirected graphs. 
This result is closely related to the theory of graphoids 
and Markov fields; see [Pea88] for a description of these 
notions. 
A utility function satisfies a CA-independence if and only 
if it can be written in a particular functional form. This 
functional form is an additive decomposition of the utility 
function, that is analogous to a product decomposition of 
a probability function and leads to a similar reduction of 
dimensionality. Our results show how this functional form 
can be read directly from the graph that represents the CA­
independencies of the utility function. 
As we briefly discuss in Section 3.1, an additive utility de­
composition can simplify expected utility and related com­
putations. Tatman and Shachter [ST90] show one way to 
take advantage of this phenomenon in influence diagram 
computation. If we are given a probabilistic network with a 
topology that is "similar" to our utility graph, the potential 
for computational speedup would appear to be especially 
great. This is implicitly reflected in Jensen et al.'s work 
[JJD94], which gives another technique for evaluating in­
fluence diagrams. 
Both [JJD94] and [ST90] take an additive utility function 
as their starting point. They do not address the question 
of where the decomposition comes from. In that sense 
the results of this paper can be seen to be complementary to 
these works. We discuss the notions of utility independence 
that allow such decompositions of the utility function, and 
make a start at providing some graphical modeling tools for 
dealing with these notions of independence. The final part 
of this paper, Section 4, briefly mentions some topics that 
we believe are promising directions for future work. 
2 Preliminaries 
Decision theory is useful in a setting where the system (the 
world) may end up in one of several possible states. If we 
have some control (via our actions) as to which state obtains, 
we need to know how to choose the best action. As is 
well known, there are several axiomatizations of "rational" 
decision making that lead to the maximum expected utility 
criterion (see, e.g., [Fre88, GS88, Sav54]). This says that 
we should attempt to maximize the sum, over all states, of 
the product of the probability and the utility of each state. 
So if the probability distribution depends on the action we 
take, this criterion can determine the best action. We begin 
with a very quick review of the relevant concepts, mainly 
to set up the necessary notation. This review is based on 
the following sources [Fis82, Fre88, KR76, KLST71]. 
If there are N states a probability distribution and util­
ity function have N -1 and N-2 independent parameters, 
respectively.1 Unfortunately N is often very large, expo­
nential in the number of attributes or variables we use to 
describe a state. Thus it is important that the utility function 
possess some structure so as to simplify the tasks of elici­
tation, representation, and computation. This is of course 
exactly what graphical models based on independence try 
to achieve for probabilities. 
As in the probabilistic network literature, our first assump­
tion is that the set of states can be represented as a product 
space over some set of attributes or variables. 
Notation: Throughout this paper, we assume that V = 
{ v1, . . •  , v,.} is a fixed set of n variables. Each variable 
v has a domain d'IJ of two or more elements.2 We will 
generally use lower case letters to denote variables and 
upper case letters to denote sets of variables. (Note that this 
is somewhat nonstandard.) Where necessary, Greek letters 
will denote values for particular variables. 
The set of states S consists of the set of points in the product 
space fl:=t d'IJ,. Each s E Sis thus a vector of n values, one 
value for every variable. Clearly the size of S is exponential 
in the number of variables. 
If X � V then /(X) stands for some real valued function 
all of whose arguments are in X, i.e., 
f(X) : II d'IJ -+ IR 
'II EX 
The general form of a utility function is u(V), which can 
thus require exponentially many independent utility assess­
ments. 
A utility function u induces a preference ordering � .. on 
lotterie� (probability distributions) overS as follows: 
Pl � .. P2 iff LPt(s)u(s) � LP2(s)u(s), 
1 Utility theory is invariant with respect to affine transforma­
tions of the utility function, which is why only N -2 independent 
utilities need be found. 
2Everything we say applies for infinite domains as well. Al­
though we implicitly assume that domains are finite in parts of the 
following, this is for notational and conceptual simplicity only. 
3"Lotteries" is one of the traditional terms. It can be misleading 
in that it tends to imply that the probabilistic structure arises from 
explicit randomization or "objective" randomness. This may be 
the case, but on the other hand the probabilities can also be an 
entirely subjective measure of uncertainty. 
where P1 and p2 are two distributions overS. That is, we 
prefer Pl to P2 if Pl induces greater expected utility. Thus 
utility serves to characterize not only the agent's values but 
also its attitudes towards risk: it ranks probabilistic gambles 
between various outcomes. 
In the development of decision theory, it is natural to take 
the preference relation as primitive. Any relation satisfying 
fairly weak rationality conditions (which we don't repeat 
here, but see, e.g., [Sav54, Fis82, Fre88]) corresponds to 
some utility function exactly as above (that is, furthermore, 
unique up to affine transformations). This exact correspon­
dence between preference and utility is one of the fun­
damental theorems of decision theory. In the following, 
whenever we talk about a preference over V we mean a 
preference over lotteries overS= Ilvev d11 satisfying the 
standard rationality postulates. 
The first definition of independence we consider is utility 
independence. Intuitively, a set of attributes X is utility 
independent of everything else, if when we hold every­
thing else fixed (i.e., the values of attributes V-X), the 
induced preference structure over X does not depend on 
the particular values that V -X are fixed to. Given utility 
independence we can assert preferences over (lotteries on) 
X that hold ceteris paribus-i.e., all else being equal. 
Definition 2.1 : Consider preference!:: over V, X c V, 
Y = V-X. Let .:Y be any particular element of Ilv EY dv. 
That is, .:Y is a particular assignment of values to the vari­
ables in Y. Every probability distributionp over TivEX d11 
corresponds to a distributionp• on S = TivEV d11 such that 
p* 's marginal on X is p and p• 's marginal on Y gives prob­
ability 1 to ,:Y. We define the conditional preference over X 
given .:Y, �'Y. to be the preference ordering such that 
p !::y q iff p* !:: q*' 
where p and q are any two distributions over Ilv EX d11• I 
Definition 2.2: The set of attributes X is utility independent 
of V-X when conditional preferences for lotteries on X 
do not depend on the particular value given to V -X. That 
is, 
('</;,;' 
E II d11) p b· q iffp !:'Y' q, 
vEV-X 
where p and q are any two distributions over Ilv EX dv. I 
Utility independence fails, for instance, if one has a pref­
erence reversal between two mixtures of the attributes X, 
when some attribute in V-X is changed. Judgments of 
utility independence would appear to be fairly natural and 
common; see [KR76] for a very extensive discussion. They 
are, at heart, judgments about relevance and people seem 
to be fairly good at this in general. 
Example 2.3: Say that there are only two attributes health, 
with values H and H (healthy and not healthy), and wealth 
with values W and W (wealthy and not wealthy). If 
the agent's utility function u is defined as u(HW) = 5, 
u(HW) = 2, u(HW) = 1, and u(HW) = 0, then it can 
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be seen that for the agent health is utility independent of 
wealth and wealth is utility independent of health. Intu­
itively, no matter what the agent's wealth is fixed to, it will· 
always prefer gambles that yield H with higher probability. 
That is, the agent's preference for being healthy is the same 
no matter if the agent is wealthy or not. The same can be 
said about its attitude towards being wealthy. I 
Utility independence is known to have several strong impli­
cations. We list a few, using [KR76] as our source. First, 
utility independence is equivalent to the existence of a utility 
function with a special functional form: 
Proposition 2.4: X is utility independent of its complement 
in a preference structure!:: if and only if!: corresponds to 
some utility function of the form: 
U>-(V) = f(V -X)+ g(V -X)h(X) 
where g is positive. 4 
Thus we must assess three functions, but each has fewer 
than lVI arguments. This may mean that there are far fewer 
independent numbers to learn and to store. Most of the 
interest in utility independence in standard decision theory 
concerns the case of mutual utility independence where 
every subset of variables is independent of its complement: 
Proposition 2.5: Every subset of variables is independent 
of its complement in !:: if and only if there exists n functions 
j,(v,) (i.e., each f• t!epends on a single variable), such that 
either n 
ut(X) = ITMvi)+c 
for some constant c, or 
n 
ut(X) = L li(v1).5 
i=l 
This is an extremely strong conclusion, allowing enormous 
simplification. The precondition of the theorem might seem 
to require 0(2n) utility independence conditions, but since 
utility independence satisfies various closure properties we 
do not need this many. There are in fact several sets of n 
independencies that suffice; see [KR76]. However, then 
assertions that each attribute individually is independent of 
the rest are not sufficient. In this case, the result is weaker: 
Proposition 2.6: If every variable is utility independent of 
the rest there is a function /i ( v,) for each variable, such 
that u>-(V) is a multilinear combination of the f• 's. 
Thus we must assess n functions as well as (potentially 
exponentially many) constants to capture the interactions 
4 It is also clearly possible to arrange f and g so that h( X) = 
u>-(X,.:Y) where .:Y is an arbitrary fixed assignment to V-X. 
The function 'IL>-(X, .:Y) is sometimes called a conditional utility 
function. -
51t is more usual to express the /i in terms of conditional 
conditional utility functions and multiplicative constants. This 
representation is easy to derive, or see [KR76]. 
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among the /i 's. This may still represent a net gain. We 
suggest in Section 4 that this case might be important for 
artificial intelligence, and deserves future work. 
A much stronger form of independence is additive indepen­
dence. This can be defined in several ways, but the most 
useful for us is: 
Definition 2.7: Let Z1, ... , z,. be a partition ofV. Z1, . .. , 
z,. is additively independent (for �) if, for any probability 
distributions Pl and P2 that have the same marginals on z, 
for all i, P1 and P2 are indifferent under �, i.e., P1 � P2 
andp2 � Pl· I 
In other words, one's preference only depends on the 
marginal probabilities of the given sets of variables, and 
not on any correlation between them. 
Example 2.8: Consider the utility function given in Exam­
ple 2.3 involving health and wealth. As the previous exam­
ple pointed out, health was utility independent of wealth. 
However health is not additively independent of wealth. 
Consider the two probability functions P1 and P2· where 
Pl(HW) = Pl(HW) = Pl(HW) = P1(HW) = 1/4, and 
P2(HW) = P2(HW) = 0, P2(HW) = P2(HW) = 1/2. 
We have Pl(H) = P2(H) = 1/2 and Pl(W) = P2(W) = 
1/2. That is, P1 and P2 have identical marginals over health 
and wealth. Yet the expected utility under P1 is 2, while 
the expected utility under p2 is 5/2. This shows that there 
exists two distributions with the same marginals that are not 
indifferent under the given utility function. That is, health 
and wealth are not additively independent. 
Intuitively, the agent prefers being both healthy and wealthy 
more than might be suggested by considering the two at­
tributes separately. It thus displays a preference for proba­
bility distributions in which health and wealth are positively 
correlated. I 
Proposition 2.9 : Z1, ... , z,. are additively independent 
for� iffu't can be written as 
" 
u't(V) = L f(Z,) 
i=l 
for some functions k 
Naturally, the most interesting case is where all variables are 
additively independent separately, so that we only need to 
find one single-argument function for each variable. In the 
rest of the paper, we will be interested in additive indepen­
dence for a partition of V into two parts, V = XU Y, unless 
we say otherwise. It would seem reasonable that these are 
easier to reason with than independence assertions about 
arbitrary partitions. 
Conditional versions of both additive and utility indepen­
dence can be defined. The definitions require that the spec­
ified independence hold whenever some subset of variables 
are held fixed. For instance, 
Definition 2.1 0 : X and Y are conditionally additively 
independent (CA-independent) given Z (X, Y, Z disjoint, 
X U Y U Z = V) iff, for any fixed value 1 of Z, X and 
Y are additively independent in the conditional preference 
structure over X U Y given -r. 
In this case, we write CAl (X, Z, Y). I 
Proposition 2.1 1 : X and Y are additively independent 
givenZiffu't can be written in the formf(X, Z)+ f(Z, Y). 
3 Conditional Additive Independence 
Our main new results concern CA-independence and are 
presented in this section. As mentioned above, the concept 
of CA-independence has been defined in the literature, but 
we have found rather little development of the idea. We 
nevertheless feel that CA-independence is a useful notion 
for artificial intelligence. In particular, it is not as strong a 
requirement as additive independence: it is quite feasible 
that some variables that are not additively independent be­
come additively independent when the values of some other 
variables are fixed. Furthermore, while it is not as generally 
applicable as utility independence, utility independence of­
ten does not yield a decomposition of the utility function 
that is as computationally useful. In fact, the decomposition 
yielded by CA-independence can significantly improve the 
efficiency of computing expected utility (see Section 3.1). 
Our results here are that CA-independence is particularly 
well suited for graphical modeling. In brief, we show the 
following. First, every utility function has a perfect CA­
independence graph: a graph in which vertex separation 
corresponds exactly to CA-independence. And second, it 
is possible to read directly from the graph the most general 
functional form for utility functions satisfying the repre­
sented independencies. In the presence of nontrivial inde­
pendencies, this form typically has a much reduced "dimen­
sionality", making elicition, representation, and reasoning 
far easier. 
Our first definition defines the type of functional form we 
are after. We want the utility to be composed from functions 
with proper subsets of V as arguments-the fewer the argu­
ments the better, as the complexity of specifying a function 
explicitly (i.e., as a table) is exponential in the number of 
arguments. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the utility 
should be a linear combination of these subfunctions. 
Definition 3.1 : Let Z1, ... , z,. be (not necessarily disjoint) 
subsets of V. A function f(V) has an additive decomposi­
tion over zl, ... ' z,. if 
" 
f = Lf•(Zi) 
i=l 
for some functions f• . I 
Clearly there is no loss of generality to assume that for no 
i ,j is z, � Zj. 
This form of functional decomposition has been used before 
in the literature [JJD94, DDP88, ST90], but without any 
justification in terms of notions of utility independence. As 
Proposition 2.11 shows a utility function can be written 
in this form only if some collection of CA-independencies 
hold. 
Using this definition, we may rephrase Proposition 2.11 as 
saying that a utility function satisfies CAl (X, Z, Y) if and 
only if it has an additive decomposition over XU Z, Z U Y.  
Although we are ultimately interested in the components 
present in an additive decomposition (in particular, making 
them as few and as small as possible), proving the main 
theorems below sometimes requires that we focus on com­
ponents that are absent instead. 
Definition 3.2: Let Z1, ... , z.,. be (not necessarily disjoint) 
subsets of V .  A function f(V) has an additive decomposi­
tion that avoids Zt, ... , z.,. if 
l 
t = L:ti(Yi) 
i=l 
for some fi and some l subsets Yi C V such that for no i, j 
is z i � lj.l 
It is easy to verify using Proposition 2.1 1 that CAI(X, Z, Y) 
iff there is an additive decomposition avoiding all { :z, y} 
such that :z E X and y E Y ;  we use this in the proofs 
below. 
If u has a decomposition avoiding X, and another avoiding 
Y, dcies it have another decomposition avoiding both? It 
might seem plausible that there are functions in which an 
interaction term in either X or Y is necessary, but such that 
either one of these suffices. However, this is not in fact 
possible, and the answer to the question above is always 
yes. The next lemma, which generalizes this claim, will be 
used in several places subsequently. 
Lemma 3.3: If a utility function u(V) has decompositions 
avoiding each of X1, X2, • • •  , X.,. C V separately then it 
has a decomposition avoiding them all. 
Proof: Omitted. I 
Now we are in a position to prove our first main result. This 
says that, for any utility function, there is an undirected 
graph G = (V, E) (i.e., the nodes are the attributes) such 
that CA/(X, Z, Y) (for X U  Y U Z = V) if and only .if Z separates X from Y, i.e., every path from a node m 
X to a node in Y passes through some node in Z. In 
the terminology of [Pea88] such a graph is said to be a 
perfect map of the independence structure. Pearl and Paz 
[PP89] have given necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
independence relation to have such a map (see also [Pea88 ]), 
and we can simply apply this result in the proof below. Note 
that if follows that if two attributes are linked by an edge in 
a perfect graph for CA-independence, then we always care 
about the (probabilistic) correlation between their values. 
If there is no edge then, once all the remaining variables 
are given fixed values, we do not care whether the endpoint 
attributes are determined independently or not (i.e., this is 
irrelevant to our preferences). 
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Theorem 3.4: The set of CA-dependencies generated by 
any utility function has a perfect map. 
Proof: It is sufficient to simply check each of the five 
conditions given by Pearl and Paz. The main difficulty 
is that these conditions concern expressions of the form 
I(X, Y, Z) in which X U  Y U Z need not equal V, but 
we have not defined CA-independence in this case. So, 
for the purposes of this proof only, we make the following . 
definition. If R = V -X -Y -Z ::j:. 0, �hen CAl (X, Y, Z) 
holds iff there is some partition R = Rt U R2 such that 
CAI(X U Rt, Z, Y U R2). We now simply verify the con­
ditions, which must hold for all sets of disjoint arguments. 
Symmetry: CA/(X, Z, Y) => CAI(Y, Z,X). This is im­
mediate by the definition. 
Decomposition: CA/(X, Z, Y U W) => CA/(X, Z, Y) 1\ 
CAl (X, Z, W). This follows from the extended defi­
nition give above (because we can choose R2 to contain 
W or Y as appropriate). 
Intersection: CAI(X, ZUW, Y)l\ CAI(X, ZUY, W) => 
CAI(X,Z, Y U W). Let R = V-X-Y -Z-W. By 
assumption, there are two partitions of R, Rt. R2 and 
R�, R� say, such that CAI(X U Rt, Z U W, Y U R2) 
and CAI(X U R�, Z U Y, W U R�) hold. Let R� = 
R1 n R� and R� = R2 U R�; note that R� U R� = R. 
From the above it is easy to verify that, for each v1, v2 
with v1 E X U R� and v2 E Y U W U R�, there is 
an additive decomposition avoiding { v1, v2} . By the 
lemma, there is an additive decomposition avoiding 
them all at once. Thus CAl (XU R�, Z, Y U W U R�). 
i.e., CAI(X, Z, Y U W) as required. 
Strong union: CAl (X, Z, Y) => CAl (Y, ZUW, X). This 
follows easily, because each v E W is either in Rt or 
R2 and so, according to the antecedent, the utility can 
be decomposed so that v appears with X U Z or Y U Z 
but not both. The consequent allows it to appear with 
both, and so is strictly weaker. 
Transitivity: 
CAI(X,Z,Y) => CAI(Y,Z,w) V CAI(w ,Z,Y) 
where w is any single variable. By disjointness, we do 
not consider w E Z. Otherwise, find Rt and R2 such 
that CAl (XUR11 Z, YUR2); these must exist by defi­
nition. But then w E R1 or w E R2, and in either case 
the result follows immediately using decomposition. 
Thus, we can appeal to Pearl and Paz's result to conclude 
the proof. I 
It follows from the proof of this theorem that any CA­
independence model induced by a utility function is a 
graphoid, in the sense of [PP89]. The book [Pea88] dis­
cusses graphoids, and their graphical maps, in considerable 
detail. Note that an undirected graphical model of the type 
we consider is also called a Markov network. 
Part of the utility of this theorem is that we can represent 
and reason about CA-independencies graphically, which is 
often far more natural. However, another benefit is that we 
can read the functional form of the utility function directly 
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from its corresponding Markov network in the standard 
fashion (i.e., by identifying the cliques of the graph). 
Theorem 3.5: G = (V, E) is a CA-independence map for 
a utility function u (i.e. ,  all independencies suggested by 
vertex separation in the graph hold of u )  if and only if u has 
an additive decomposition over the set of maximal cliques 
of G. 
Proof: First, suppose u has such an additive decomposition, 
and let X, Y, Z be a partition of V such that Z separates X 
from Y in G. We must show that CAl (X, Z, Y) holds of 
u. But no clique in G can contain an element from both 
X andY (otherwise, no separator would exist). Thus, the 
hypothesized decomposition has no term involving vari­
ables from both X and Y. The result now follows from 
Proposition 2.11. 
Conversely, suppose G is a CA-independence map of u. 
Let Y be a proper superset of any maximal clique. There 
exists an additive decomposition over cliques if there is 
a decomposition avoiding all such Y. By Lemma 3.3, it 
suffices to consider each Y separately. Suppose, for a con­
tradiction, that it is impossible to avoid Y. Let X C Y be 
a maximal clique. There must be some y E Y such that 
not all members of X are connected toy in G. (Otherwise, 
XU y is a larger clique). Let :z: E X not be connected to 
y by an edge. But then V- {:z:, y} separates z andy, and 
so CAl ( { :z:} , V- { :z:, y} , {y} ), hence there is a decompo­
sition avoiding {:z:, y}, and hence avoiding Y. This gives 
the necessary contradiction. I 
This means that we can read a suitable function form di­
rectly from the graph, by finding cliques. Unless the graph 
is complete, this gives us a nontrivial decomposition of 
u. By Theorem 3.4, the procedure of finding a graph using 
CA-independence and then using it this way is capable of re­
vealing all the information inherent in CA-independencies. 
In a sense, this is quite a strong result. Probabilistic inde­
pendence does not always admit perfect Markov networks. 
Thus, while probabilistic independence maps are certainly 
a useful technique, they do not have the same power as if 
we were to just reason about independence directly. On 
the other hand, this contrast is a bit misleading. Although 
graphical models can capture CA-independence perfectly, 
the concept of CA-independence itself is somewhat weak. 
Example 3.6: Consider all utility functions over three vari­
ables of the form 
u(:z:, y, z ) = /(:z:, y) + f(y, z) + /(:z:, z) . 
It is easy to verify that there are no independencies (utility 
or additive, conditional or otherwise) that are common to all 
such functions. The CA-independence is a complete graph 
(a triangle) and so does not reflect the fact that u has quite 
a simple form. I 
This shows that certain linear functional forms, that entail 
just the computational and representational advantages we 
seek, are not revealed by the independence concepts seen 
so far. Are there other concepts of independence that do 
not have this weakness? The answer is yes. 
Definition 3.7: Let Z1, . . .  , Z�c be sets of variables not 
necessarily disjoint such that V = U, z, . Z1, . . •  , Z�c is 
generalized additively independent (for�) if, for any prob­
ability distributions Pl and p2 that have the same marginals 
on z, for all i, P1 and P2 are indifferent under �. I 
This notion of independence is just like additive indepen­
dence except that the z, do not need to be disjoint. Now 
it can be shown that Proposition 2.9 still holds, but with 
generalized additive independence instead of additive inde­
pendence. 
Proposition 3.8 : Zt, ... , Z�c are generalized additively 
independent for� iffut. can be written as 
k 
ut(V) = L f(Z,) 
i=l 
for some functions k 
In other words, from Definition 3.1, the z, are generalized 
additive independent iff the utility function u has an additive 
decomposition over them. 
This shows that any additive decomposition corresponds 
exactly to a single assertion of general independence. We 
have not seen the idea of generalized independence as given 
above defined explicitly in the literature, or Proposition 3.8 
noted. We prove this proposition using the following de­
ceptively powerful result of Fishburn's [Fis82]. 
Theorem 3.9: [Fishburn] Let� be a preference structure 
over some collection of states S' C S = II .. ev d..,. We say 
that some partition Z1, ... Z�c ofV are additively indepen­
dent over S' if all probability distributions P1 and P2 with 
support in S', that have the same marginals on z, for all i, 
are indifferent under �. 
Then Z1, ... , Z�c are additively independent overS' iff there 
exist functions f• such that 
k 
ut(V) =I: J, (z, ) i=l 
is valid on S'. 
Fishburn's theorem basically says that Proposition 2.9 con­
tinues to hold over subsets of the product space (with the 
appropriate notions restricted to that subset). The ability to 
restrict to a subset of the product space, and thus impose 
fixed interdependencies among the variables, is nontrivial; 
see [KLSTI 1] for other relevant discussion. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8: Our proof utilizes a technique 
suggested by Fishburn in [Fis82]. Let S = II .. ev d..,, 
and consider any z, = { v11 • • •  , vt} say. Corresponding 
to this, we can construct a new variable z,, whose do­
main is isomorphic to IJ!=l d;. Now consider the space 
T = IJ;=l z,. Each s E S corresponds to an element of 
T (because S implies a unique value for each of the sets 
of variables z, and thus for z,), and thus S corresponds 
to a subset T' ofT. Instead of probability and prefer­
ence overS, we can equivalently consider probability and 
preference over T'. But note that the marginal probabil­
ity of Zi in S is equal to the marginal probability over 
Zi in T'. Thus the assumption of Theorem 3.9 is in fact 
equivalent to the precondition of Proposition 3.8. Hence, 
the preference structure corresponds to a utility function 
u(V) = 2:::=1 f(zi) = 2:::=1 f(Zi). I 
Of course, even though any additive decomposition corre­
sponds to a single generalized independence assertion, it is 
probably unreasonable to try to discover the latter directly. 
Thus simpler but more accessible concepts such as (plain) 
CA-independence will remain important. 
3.1 Computation 
It should be clear that an additively decomposable util­
ity function has advantageous computational implications. 
For instance, if we have no more concise representation of 
utility than just u(V), we must consider each possible state 
in lSI individually. This is true no matter how the prob­
ability distribution is given to us. But towards the other 
extreme, if u has an additive decomposition over v1, . . .  , VA: 
(i.e., u(V) = 2::�=1 fi(vi)) then we only need to find n 
marginal probabilities, because the expected utility of u is 
the sum of the expected utilities of the fi, by linearity of ex­
pectation. Finding these probabilities can be very easy (for 
instance, linear time given a singly connected Bayesian net­
work; see [Pea88]). This example shows that the advantage 
of additive utility independence is not simply the reduction 
of dimensionality. Other decompositions may be as good 
in this respect, but not offer any clear benefits for compu­
tation; for example, consider the product utility functions 
that can be entailed by mutual utility independence (Propo­
sitions 2.5 and 2.6). 
To show the possible advantages in somewhat more detail, 
consider probability distributions given by general Bayesian 
networks. One of the most popular ways of computing 
probabilities from a network is to form a join tree; see 
[LS88, Pea88]. Without going into details, we note that 
the join tree is a tree of sets of variables. If, for instance, 
C = v1, v2, • • •  , VA: is a node in the join tree then the domain 
of cis just the product space n:=l d .. ,. Join trees can be 
used to maintain the marginal distribution over all nodes 
C; the complexity of this process is determined by the 
domain sizes of nodes such as C (which can of course be 
exponential, although in many cases will be of reasonable 
size). 
Suppose, however, that u is decomposable over Z1, • • •  , Zk 
and each Zi is a subset of some node in the join tree. In 
this case, expected utility computations can be performed 
essentially for free, "piggy-backing" on the probability cal­
culations in the probabilistic join tree. Again, this is a 
consequence of linearity of expectation and the fact that 
the marginal over C is enough to calculate the expectation 
of any f(Zi) with Zi � C. If this containment property 
(see [DDP88]) property does not hold, we may need to add 
edges to the Bayesian network or join tree to establish it. 
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In this case, the extra cost involved in calculating expected 
utility is a function of the number of edges we need to add. 
Roughly speaking, the greater the similarity between the 
Bayesian network (or join tree) and the utility graph, the 
less extra work will be required to compute expected util­
ity. The technique presented by Jensen et al. [JJD94] for 
evaluating influence diagrams uses such ideas, as does the 
somewhat related proposal of Dechter et al. [DDP88] in the 
context of constraint satisfaction. 
Another very relevant work is [ST90], which also uses de­
composable utility functions (there called "separable") for 
evaluating influence diagrams. But this paper deals with 
both additive and multiplicative decompositions, and so 
perhaps does not offer as much potential savings as, say, 
Jensen et al.'s proposal. Finding out whether this is really 
so would be helped by a more precise analysis of how a 
utility independence independence structure, and its simi­
larity (or otherwise) to a given probabilistic independence 
structure, can affect computational efficiency. We hope to 
address this issue in future work. 
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
A direct extension of this work would be to investigate 
the possibility and usefulness of graphical models for other 
relevant concepts of independence. Von Stengel [vS88], 
utilizing the work of Gorman [Gor68], has shown that a 
utility function can be graphically represented as a com­
position tree that captures its utility independencies. The 
nodes of this tree are subsets of variables, with the root be­
ing equal to V. Besides this work on utility independence 
however, there seems to have been little else done in this 
area. 
For instance, are there models using directed graphs (like 
Bayesian networks) for additive independence? What about 
generalized additive independence? The case of utility in­
dependence also deserves further attention. Gorman's com­
position tree approach leaves us with a graphical model that 
is quite distinct from graphical probabilistic models where 
the nodes represent single variables rather than sets of vari­
ables. Hence, it is not clear how such a model can be uti­
lized in conjunction with modern techniques of probability 
structuring. 
It may turn out that the use of graphical models for utility 
representation only has a limited usefulness. On a broader 
level, though, we are convinced that decision theory is a 
critical part of artificial intelligence and thus there should 
be more work, in various directions, towards more sophisti­
cated utility modeling. Having said this, research in utility 
modeling need not start from nothing, but can and should 
draw on the considerable amount of existing ideas and tech­
niques in other disciplines. 
We close by discussing one fairly speculative topic for fu­
ture research. Although we are firm believers in the standard 
decision theory paradigm, it is surely the case that utility 
(like, perhaps, probability) is not always a concept that the 
AI "end-user" should have to deal with directly. Utilities 
determine the purpose of a decision making process, but 
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it seems at least as common and sometimes more natural 
to specify this purpose using such concepts as goals, con­
straints, and so on. If we could give the idea of a "goal" 
clear and complete semantics in terms of utility functions, 
we could compile a specification in terms of goals into one 
in terms of utility (so that decision theory could then be 
used). But finding such semantics is certainly not a trivial 
task. We must cope with interacting and even contradic­
tory goals, conditional goals, and more. We should also 
interpret goals in a natural fashion, which is likely to de­
mand default reasoning of some sort. For instance, given 
two separate goals A and B, it is often reasonable that the 
conjunction A 1\ B is a desirable thing to achieve as well, 
unless there is a specific reason to believe otherwise. This 
is something like a default assumption of independence 
over goals. Taking this idea literally would involve ideas 
such as Proposition 2.6, but there appear to be numerous 
complicating factors including: the rich structure of goals 
and preference stated in a logical language, which may not 
match the nice factorization of the state space assumed in 
Section 2; the implications of making this independence 
a default, and the interaction with all the other default as­
sumptions that might be necessary; the notion of condi­
tional goals and the various logical issues they raise; and 
so on. As we have said, some work in this direction exists 
[Bou94, DW91, DSW91, DW94, TP94], but there remains 
much to be done. 
References 
[Bou94] C. Boutilier. Towards a logic of qualitative de­
cision theory. In Principles of Knowledge Rep­
resentation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the 
4'th International Conference (KR'94), 1994. 
[DDP88] R. Dechter, A. Dechter, and J. Pearl. Optimiza­
tion in constraint networks. In R. M. Oliver 
and J. Q. Smith, editors, Influence Diagrams 
Belief Nets and Decision Analysis, pages 411-
425. Wiley, 1988. 
[DSW91] J. Doyle, Y. Shoham, and M. P. Wellman. A 
logic of relative desire (preliminary report). In 
Proc. 6th International Symposium on Methe­
dologies for Intelligent Systems, pages 16-31, 
1991. 
[DW91] J. Doyle and M. P. Wellman. Preferential se­
mantics for goals. In Proc. 9th National Con­
ference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI '91), 
pages 698-703, 1991. 
[DW92] J. Doyle and M. P. Wellman. Modular utility 
representation for decision-theoretic planning. 
In Proc. 1st International Conference on Arti­
ficial Intelligence Planning Systems (A/PS-92), 
pages 236-242, 1992. 
[DW94] J. Doyle and M. P. Wellman. Representing 
preferences as ceteris paribus comparatives. In 
AAAI Spring Symposium on decision-theoretic 
planning, pages 69-75, 1994. 
[Fis82] P. C. Fishburn. The Foundations of Expected 
Utility. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982. 
[Fre88] S. French. Decision Theory. Ellis Horwood, 
Chichester, West Sussex, England, 1988. 
[Gor68] W. M. Gorman. The structure of utility func­
tions. Review of Economic Studies, 35:367-
390, 1968. 
[GS88] P. Gardenfors and N. Sahlin, editors. Decision, 
Probabilility, and Utility: Selected Readings. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988. 
[JJD94] F. Jensen, F. V. Jensen, and S. Dittmer. 
From influence diagrams to junction trees. In 
Proc. Tenth Annual Conference on Uncertainty 
Artificial Intelligence, 1994. 
[KLST71] D. H. Krantz, R. D. Luce, P. Suppes, and 
A. Tversky. FoundationsofMeasurement. Aca­
demic Press, New York, 1971. 
[KR76] R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa. Decisions with Mul­
tiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade­
offs. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1976. 
[LS88] S. L. Lauritzen and D. J. Spiegelhalter. Lo­
cal computations with probabilities on graph­
ical structures and their application to expert 
systems. Journal of the Royal Statistical Soci­
ety B, 50(2):240-265, 1988. 
[MH69] J. M. McCarthy and P. J. Hayes. Some philo­
sophical problems from the standpoint of artifi­
cial intelligence. In D. Michie, editor, Machine 
Intelligence 4, pages 463-502. Edinburgh Uni­
versity Press, Edinburgh, UK, 1969. 
[Pea88] J. Pearl. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent 
Systems. Morgan Kaufmann, 1988. 
[PP89] J. Pearl and A. Paz. Graphoids: A graph­
based logic for reasoning about relevance re­
lations. In B. Du Boulay, editor, Advances in 
Artificial Intelligence-//. North-Holland, New 
York, 1989. 
[Sav54] L. J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. 
Dover, New York, 1954. 
[SP90] G. Shafer and J. Pearl, editors. Readings in 
Uncertain Reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann, San 
Mateo, CA, 1990. 
[ST90] R. D. Shachter and J. A. Tatman. Dynamic 
programming and influence diagrams. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernet­
ics, 20(2):365-379, 1990. 
[TP94] S. Tan and J. Pearl. Qualitative decision theory. 
In Proc. 12th National Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (AAAI '94 ), pages 928-932, 1994. 
[vS88] B. von Stengen. Decomposition of multiat­
tributeexpected-utility functions. Annals of Op­
eration Research, 16:161- 184, 1988. 
